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I. Introduction
Since September 11 of 2001 there is a growing interest in understanding the di↵er-
ent determinants of terrorism across countries. From the beginning the media and
the general public were very receptive to research lines that remarked the importance
of, in the first place, the political underdevelopment and in subsequent studies the
poor socio-economic conditions. It is essential then make clear what are the causes
of terrorism because this phenomenon certainly implies strong delays in economic and
social development, in other words, the immediate damage of a terrorist attack may be
marginal but this phenomenon gradually acquire substantial political and social costs
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Gupta et al., 2004; Crain and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2008). More specifically, some of those consequences are the reduction of
international trade (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004), immigration issues (Dreher et al.,
2011), reduction on FDI (Enders and Sandler, 1996), a direct impact on many economic
activities such as tourism (Enders et al., 1992), and of course a decline in the individual
and collective life satisfaction (Frey et al., 2009).
This study aims to present evidence that poor socio-economic conditions as a cause
of nonconformity of the population with central governments are accompanied by a
geographical fragmentation factor that increases such nonconformity. That is, the geo-
graphical fragmentation usually leads to lower government presence throughout the na-
tional territory (in line what is presented by Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2011)) which
means a poorer socio-economic conditions for settled communities and ultimately that
encourages outlaw forces to using the complexity of the territory in order to strengthen
and increase their operational capability against the central government (this argument
agrees in the socio-economic issue remarked by Freytag et al. (2011), and then with
the terrorist response to nonconformity pointed out by Crenshaw (1981) and Krueger
and Malecˇkova´ (2003)). In fact, Okafor and Piesse (2017) carried out a recent research
in which they measured how prone a country becomes to terrorism according to the
fragility of the state (linked to its inability to manage power throughout the national
territory). This phenomenon not only causes domestic but also transnational terrorism
as in the Colombian case where the group FARC was operating from Ecuadorian and
Venezuelan territory (evidenced in the Raul Reyes fall operation).
To capture these e↵ects it is used the Geographic Fragmentation Index (GFI) im-
plemented by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) in their contribution regard decentral-
ization and the index is calculated taking into account the weighted average probability
to find two individuals in di↵erent geographical areas within one country. This index
can be biased by di↵erences in total area dimensions between countries and with the
aim of capturing this e↵ect will be used the GFI in interaction with the total area as
an addition to the estimates.
Following the main thesis of this article presenting the geographical fragmentation
as an element that increases the number of terrorist attacks at generating absence of the
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government throughout the national territory, robustness checks are performed interact-
ing the mentioned variable (GFI*area) with two other variables to ensure the statistical
significance of this political associated phenomenon. On the one hand, according to the
review presented by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and specific arguments such as the
one in Li (2005a) (which will be explain in following sections) the level of democracy
represents to some extent the behavior of the government and it is correlated with
terrorism, therefore, an interaction of this index with our proposed variable will be pre-
sented. In fact, Abadie (2004) provides evidence that greater political freedom increases
the terrorist conduct particularly in periods of transition from an authoritarian regime
to a democratic one. On the other hand, according to the literature, an element that
could capture this e↵ect of greater absence of the state is the level of political and fiscal
decentralization in the country, in literature there are conflicting positions about the
federalism and its e↵ect on terrorism but few empirical estimates; for this reason and
following the approaches of Frey and Luechinger (2004) that support the inclusion of
this variable, we assess the e↵ect of federalism as an interaction to our proposed variable
taking into account that there is even less literature that has evaluated the federalism
in a socio-economic context and its impact on the number of terrorist attacks.
With this study we contribute to academic discussion related to the determinants
of terrorism, first providing support on the idea that terrorism depends at least in
part, in a set of variables that reflect the poor socio-economic environment of the
communities that tend to rise weapons in response thereto1. This part of the study
is focused on the paper presented by Freytag et al. (2011) which is an approach on
these determinants based on the opportunity cost of terrorism. In turn, noting that the
factors that help increase the opportunity cost of terrorism (eg, socio-economic growth)
have the potential to significantly reduce violent behaviors of communities.
Second, we provide empirical evidence in relation to our geographical fragmenta-
tion hypothesis as a determinant of terrorism, we do it taking into account the socio-
economic situation of 128 countries between 1971 and 2005. Following previous studies
and according to the points mentioned above, we use a database reporting domestic
and transnational terrorism. We found that geographical fragmentation makes more
attractive terrorist behavior and its e↵ect is consistent across methods, also by intro-
ducing regional dummies and mainly temporal dummies depicting historical events that
have caused significant increases in the number terrorist attacks per year. Our find-
ings on the geographical fragmentation variables support literature that remarks the
importance of total government presence throughout their national territory in order
to increase the opportunity cost of violent behavior and the generation of illegitimate
groups that use the terrorism as a means to achieve their objectives. The paper is orga-
nized as follows: Section II surveys some relevant previous research refers to the study
of terrorism from which we select our variables to control for socio-economic conditions.
1To be more specific, these variables reflects for instance poor social welfare policies, economic
discrimination and low levels of international commerce (Burgoon, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2006,
2005; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2010; Caruso and Schneider, 2011).
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Section III presents methodology and data used. Section IV presents our findings and
respective analysis. Section V concludes.
II. Determinants of terrorism: a review
A generally accepted definition of terrorism is “the deliberate use of violence and intim-
idation directed at a small group of people to coerce a community (government) com-
prising demands political or ideologically motivated” (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011).
In the mainstream terrorists’ interests are usually divided on short and long term in-
terests; according to Tavares (2004), the short-term interests are: 1) gain publicity
and media attention, 2) destabilize the political system and 3) damage the economic
system. According to Frey and Luechinger (2004), the long-term interests are seeking
redistribution of power, wealth and influence.
According to the above, in the economic study terrorist is treated as a rational
subject, ie, terrorists behave as the homo economicus (Caplan, 2006) and that implies
that terrorist acts are nothing but a search of the individual to maximize their profit
taking certain restrictions, costs and benefits like any other economic decision (Sandler
and Enders, 2004). According to Frey and Luechinger (2004), benefits from terrorism
are derived to achieving tactical and strategic objectives of each attack, and costs are
derived from the invested resources and the opportunity cost of violent behavior.
II.I Schools of thought: commonly accepted hypothesis
According to the points made by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), conditions of each coun-
try alter both the costs and the benefits of terrorist behavior and therefore the level of
attacks occurring. Given the above, in the economic literature there are several schools
of thought that have presented global assumptions about the main determinants of ter-
rorism2. The first global hypothesis emphasizes the role of economic deprivation, that
is, poverty and inequality between countries. Gurr (2015) presented the idea of “rela-
tive deprivation” in which the individual decides to become a terrorist when comparing
what he thinks he deserves with what is already receiving through the distribution
process of the economy. In other words, poor economic conditions create frustration
through society and that leads to the generation of violent behavior.
Another global hypothesis is focused on what scholars have called the moderniza-
tion process. Following Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), a modernization process which
involves economic change (accompanied by economic growth in some sectors and not
in others), new forms of communication and lifestyles, as well as new social ideas. Ac-
cording to Robison et al. (2006), these factors can create grievances associated with
socio-economic or demographic tensions. For example, the modernization process can
2This does not imply that global hypothesis contradict each other. Conversely, they complement
and each comprise a remarkable contribution to literature.
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create new jobs in certain economic activities as well as many jobless in more traditional
activities and this can be translated into incentives to use weapons as an alternative
means of achieving certain objectives. In other words, tensions occur during the pro-
cess of changing from a traditional society to a modern (Ross, 1993). However, as
highlighted by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) these changes are di cult to capture in
empirical analysis and for this reason some commonly accepted variables have been used
such as education level and population growth with respect to demographic change.
Also, as remarked in previous section, there is an important segment of the literature
emphasizing that poor socio-economic conditions are determinants of terrorist conduct
reflected in, for example, inadequate social welfare policies, economic discrimination and
low levels of economic openness (Burgoon, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2006, 2005; Krieger
and Meierrieks, 2010; Caruso and Schneider, 2011). Poor socio-economic conditions
significantly reduce the opportunity cost of terrorism. Considering the above, this
study used the variables commonly used to capture socio-economic conditions and enter
a variable to capture the e↵ect of geographic fragmentation on estimations. Theory that
closest supports the introduction of variables with this nature is briefly described at
the end of this section.
Political and institutional order is also one of the global accepted hypothesis in
literature. According to Li (2005a), democratic regimes can o↵er di↵erent nonviolent
methods for nonconformist groups express their ideas but are unable to make strong
resistance to terrorism when it is already in operation by its obligation to continue
respecting certain civil liberties. However, there is no consensus on what is the political
system that best reduces the likelihood of emerging terrorist acts. In any case, it is clear
that the way institutions are established in each country influence the cost-benefit cal-
culation of potential terrorist agents. On the other hand, according to Bjørnskov et al.
(2008) decentralization increases the well-being of individuals and Frey and Luechinger
(2004) emphasize that decentralized countries are more stable than the centralized
countries in political and administrative terms. In fact, arguments are found in liter-
ature that support the idea that the federalist countries tend to be more e cient in
the governance activity and in the administration of security (Brennan and Buchanan
(1990), Tiebout (1961)); with this, our research aims to present as robustness check
empirical evidence of the referred e↵ects by using the classification of federal countries
implemented by Treisman (2002) in interaction with the geographical fragmentation
index.
Instability and political transformation are also generally accepted as causes of ter-
rorism because, as argued by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), political instability creates
gaps which terrorist groups can take advantage because the opportunity cost of terror-
ism decreases. That is, instability and political transformation tend to amplify terrorist
behavior. On the other hand, Huntington (1996) remarked that civilizational clash also
generates terrorist acts. With this Huntington (1996) refers to di↵erences in religious
or ethnic nature can create disputes both within a country and between countries with
di↵erent ideologies organized (such as the recent conflict between ISIS and the mainly
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Christian Western countries). A religious determination can eliminate any moral re-
straint and contributes to the cohesion of terrorist organizations, which makes the least
expensive and most e↵ective terrorist conduct (Bernholz, 2006).
The global economic and political order (globalization) is also one of the commonly
accepted determinants remarked by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011). Economic inte-
gration (measured by the commercial opening), foreign policy, as well as the alliances
between countries can wake up great discontent in a sizable segment of the population
that in the absence of alternatives take up arms as a sign of his opposition (Bergesen
and Lizardo, 2004). In fact, this phenomenon can lead to transnational terrorism when
an ally of the government su↵ers from terrorist attacks by an insurgent group because
of the support that this country is making to its ally (Addison and Murshed, 2005), and
of course terrorism is also submitted to the confront of two di↵erent ideologies between
countries as was reported in the Cold War (O’brien, 1996).
Finally, the closest global hypothesis to the central theme of this research is con-
tagion. The main idea of this hypothesis is that terrorism is strengthened with regard
to time and space (Midlarsky et al., 1980). Many authors have submitted studies on
the temporal and geographical contagion, some of them are Lai (2007), Plu¨mper and
Neumayer (2010), Hess and Blomberg (2008), Enders and Sandler (2005), and Piazza
(2007). The temporary contagion emphasizes that terrorism past may come back in the
present, for example for organizations such as FARC was much more cost e↵ective to
carry out a terrorist campaign with continuous attacks. The spatial contagion, as de-
fined by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), means that if a country su↵ers from terrorism
is likely to generate terrorism in its neighboring countries. However, the geographi-
cal position di↵ers substantially from the hypothesis of our research in which we will
try that the geographical fragmentation of each country reduces the opportunity cost
the terrorist organizations because there is no central government that does presence
throughout the territory and that presents a substantial opportunity for these groups
to consolidate and strengthen.
III. Methodology and data
In this section we specify the data used and the method to evaluate if our hypothesis
about the geographical fragmentation has validity using features within the countries
in terms of socio-economic conditions. According to Freytag et al. (2011), a legitimate
assumption is that macroeconomic variables are correlated with terrorism since the level
of violence is not only related to individual consideration on the cost of opportunity
but also to the support communities provide to the individual terrorist (organization),
which in turn depends on the socio-economic conditions3.
3Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) presented a detailed study on popular support to terrorism.
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III.I Measuring Terrorism
Our dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks (domestic and transnational)
in a given country for each year. This information was collected for 128 countries
between 1971 and 2005. The building itself is a variable with data fromGlobal Terrorism
Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). It is important to clarify that the transnational
terrorism is a↵ected by international variables (Dreher and Gassebner, 2008; Savun
and Phillips, 2009) and these variables little a↵ect domestic terrorism (e.g., Savun and
Phillips (2009)). However, following Freytag et al. (2011) what is intended in these
types of studies is an analysis based solely on the socio-economic framework.
Figure 1: Level of terrorist attacks in 1990 for the 128 countries available
495
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III.II Measuring Geography
We measure geography in two interacting dimensions: First, through a Geographic
Fragmentation Index (GFI), previously developed by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016);
and second through country area. The index reflects the weighted probability that two
individuals taken at random in the country do not live in similar altitude zones, with
the weight matrix calculated as the average distance between altitudes. Thus the index
is simply calculated as:
1 
JX
j=1
NX
i=1
(Wij
ni
N
)2, (1)
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Where njN is the share of population by elevation and Wij measures the distance
between altitude i and altitude j. This measure goes from zero, which corresponds to
a case where all the population is settled in the same altitude zone, to one which cor-
responds to the implausible case where each individual lives in a di↵erent altitude. In
general, geographical fragmentation will increase with the number of altitude-zones and
the more equal weights for each group4. It can also be the case of geographical fragmen-
tation is enhanced with country size, and to allow for that we interact the geographical
fragmentation index with country land area. Figure 2 shows the geographical fragmen-
tation index ranked from countries that are less fragmented (i.e. Belarus, Paraguay) to
countries that show high levels of geographical fragmentation (i.e., Colombia, China,
or Switzerland). In order to use the logged variable appropriate for the zero inflated
negative binomial estimation, which is explain in the following section, and do not incur
in negative values the index is then multiplying by 100 as is presented in table 1.
Figure 2: Map of geographical fragmentation index for the 128 countries available
47.13
3.36
No data
Source: Martinez-Vazquez and Yedgenov Canavire-Bacarreza, (2015)
At this point it is important data analysis by region. In figure 3 is noted that
Geographical Fragmentation Index (GFI) without interaction with area presents four
outliers, two in America and two in Asia. To be more precise these outliers are Paraguay,
Uruguay, Singapore and Bangladesh. However, according to figure 3 the variable GFI
interacting with total area only presents an outlier (i.e Singapore) which benefits con-
siderably estimates and should be taken into account when analyzing results.
4The methodology applied for the index is similar to the one applied by Gallup et al. (2003) for
geography and that applied by Hudson (1972) for population
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Figure 3: Box plot for GFI and GFI*area by continental region
(a) GFI
0
10
20
30
40
50
G
FI
Africa Oceania América Asia Europe
(b) GFI*area
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
G
FI
 * 
Ar
ea
Africa Oceania América Asia Europe
III.III Measuring socio-economic conditions
The main set of socio-economic variables are taken from the Penn World Table (e.g.,
Summers and Heston (1991)). According to Freytag et al. (2011), we included real
GDP per capita and its square since, on the one hand, a higher per capita income
tends to reflect a greater capacity of the state (e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003)). What
this implies is that it decreases the likelihood of open rebellion, but at the same time,
according to Blomberg et al. (2004), increases the likelihood of a clandestine activity.
The relationship is non-linear, then at the beginning is expected to have a positive
e↵ect on the possibility of clandestine activity but later it is expected a negative e↵ect
by a simple income e↵ect related to the opportunity cost mentioned above.
The aggregate level of consumption (consumption as a percentage of GDP) is simply
used because high levels of consumption represent better socio-economic conditions on
the demand side (e.g., Headey et al. (2008)). At the same time, the level of openness
decreases the levels of terrorist attacks being correlated with greater economic growth
and an improvement in the socio-political conditions (e.g., Levine and Renelt (1992);
Dollar and Kraay (2004)). In the same way, higher levels of investment (investment
as a percentage of GDP) imply a greater economic participation, economic growth and
therefore better socio-economic conditions (e.g., Levine and Renelt (1992)). Finally,
according to Blomberg et al. (2004), in times of little economic growth the terrorist
behavior tends to be more attractive because of its low opportunity cost and it is the
reason we introduce the annual rate of economic growth.
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III.IV Controls
According to Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), we use some non-economic variables as
controls in the estimates. The first of these is a variable as a proxy for the level of
democracy in the countries, according to this author, there is no consensus on the e↵ect
of democracy on the level of terrorist attacks since, on the one hand, democracy o↵ers
higher levels of participation and legitimate channels to express grievances. On the other
hand, democracy provides more liberties which makes the terrorist behavior less costly.
In addition, Li (2005b) argues that democracies tend to have institutions that limit
political and military actions of the government to suppress directly insurgent groups
which reduces the opportunity cost of these groups at the time of deciding to become
terrorists. Is chosen then the rate of political development Polity2 (from POLITY IV
project) although, according to Freytag et al. (2011), it is assumed the potential bias of
this variable with respect to the dependent variable being collected from media, that is,
that democracies tend to put less restrictions on dissemination of information that other
social systems. With our data there is a clear positive relationship between the level of
democracy and terrorist attacks (figure 4) maximized by the geographical fragmentation
of the countries, this gives us a first indication of the GFI influence in terrorist behavior.
See appendix A.I to find confidence intervals and statistical significance associated to
each interval.
However, Piazza (2008) found that political instability cause terrorist since for those
groups outside the law is easier to attack new regimes that are not consolidated and
they do not have much support, here is used the number of years since the most recent
change of regime, a variable from the POLITY IV project. In figure 5 is presented this
variable in interaction with GFI*area (logged). See appendix A.II to find confidence
intervals and statistical significance associated to each interval.
According to Kirk (1983), greater government size makes terrorist behavior attrac-
tive because it implies higher economic and political rents that are generally the interests
of this type of illegitimate groups. It is used the component of the government (as a per-
centage of GDP) submitted by Penn World Table. Similarly, according to Krieger and
Meierrieks (2011), terrorist behavior is more likely in countries with greater population
because this means demographic, ethnic tensions and more di cult for the government
to enforce the law throughout the national territory. It is used the population size
presented also by Penn World Table. Finally, according to Merari (1993), countries in
times of civil war present much higher levels of terrorist attacks, then, it is a variable
that is expected to be statistically significant and especially in its interaction with our
geographical fragmentation variable as shown in figure 6. For this variable data from
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is taken, and it will be a dummie variable which
takes the value 1 if the internal conflict takes at least 1000 victims per year. See ap-
pendix A.III to find confidence intervals and statistical significance associated to each
interval in figure 6.
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Figure 4: Margins plot of terrorist attacks by democracy and GFI*area (logged)
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Figure 5: Margins plot of terrorist attacks by regime stability and GFI*area (logged)
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Figure 6: Margins plot of terrorist attacks by civil war and GFI*area (logged)
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total terrorist attacks 5220 14.69732 54.13488 0 710
Geographic Fragmentation Index (logged) 4608 3.456484 0.3797782 1.211915 3.852882
GFI*Total area (logged) 4608 5.966781 0.4272635 3.794779 6.530587
Population (logged) 5220 9.010988 1.620574 4.491161 14.08272
Real GDP per capita (logged) 4831 8.499361 1.160437 5.033303 11.48908
Trade openness (logged) 4831 4.04888 0.7022133 0.082522 6.100463
Consumption (logged) 4831 4.123469 0.3672235 1.621194 5.530619
Government size (logged) 4831 2.796318 0.4828129 0.3631031 4.220289
Investment (logged) 4827 2.806613 0.7033434 -0.6996688 4.502944
Economic growth 4784 1.711539 7.704825 -65.02475 131.2425
Civil war 5220 0.0519157 0.2218781 0 1
Democracy 4631 0.6324768 7.435315 -10 10
Regime stability 4676 22.16681 28.86139 0 196
Federal 5220 0.1586207 0.365357 0 1
Note: See appendix A.VI where countries in the study are reported
III.V Methodology
Having a dependent count variable (the number of terrorist attacks by year and coun-
try) it is necessary to apply a regression method designed for this type of variables.
Now, given the nature of the variable there are two important aspects that need to
be modeled: first, according to Freytag et al. (2011), the overdispersion feature allows
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us to use a negative binomial model instead of a Poisson model type5. See appendix
B.I on dispersion evidence related to the level of political development (Democracy).
As highlight by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), this type of models are useful tools in
the study of terrorism. Second, having a dependent variable highly inflated at zero
makes essential to introduce a binary model that captures the variable that cause in
large measure a sustained absence of terrorism and allows the count negative binomial
model capture the determinants of the level of terrorist attacks. See appendix B.II to
find histograms as evidence of a dependent variable highly inflated to zero.
The variable on the level of democracy (taken from the Polity IV project) becomes
crucial in the zero inflated negative binomial estimations because after applying the
Vuong (1989) test and analyze the behavior reflected in figure 4 it is presented as the
indicated variable for the binary component of the model. In some models regional
and year dummies are included to capture heterogeneity and serial correlation. Future
changes will be implemented in robustness check sections (IV.II and IV.III).
IV. Empirical Results
IV.I Main results
First of all, preliminary results are presented in table 2 for OLS to have a first overview of
the e↵ects generated by our geographical variables, such as the socio-economic variables
and additional controls implemented. As noted in table 2, preliminary results show a
positive and significant e↵ect for geographical fragmentation variables, for both GFI
to GFI in interaction with the total area, through the di↵erent additional controls
(temporary and regional dummies). Thus, the socio-economic variables are in line with
the findings of Freytag et al. (2011) which in these early estimates by OLS, as expected,
do not have the expected significance because the estimates not model the dispersion as
well as the high number of zeros in our dependent variable. However, checks associated
with political variables as the regime stability also have an expected direction of the
e↵ect, it is important to recognize that the civil war variable has a very big influence
in terrorist attacks, a magnitude to take into account in subsequent estimates.
When analyzing table 3, as discussed earlier in the hypothesis of this study, a positive
and significant e↵ect at the 1% between geographical fragmentation variables and the
number of terrorist attacks after zero inflation negative binomial estimates is presented.
These results are consistent between models in which the Geographical Fragmentation
Index (GFI) and national total area used separately (models 1, 2, 3), as well as in
those that use both variables in interaction (GFI*area). However, there is a change of
magnitude in the e↵ects of the first three models previously mentioned in comparison
with the last three models. Looking at margins of table 4 is noted, with regard to the
5Cameron and Trivedi (2013) for a more detailed description of this type of models of counting.
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Table 2: OLS estimations (preliminar approach)
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS
Real GDP per capita t-1 (logged) 98.26*** 91.55*** 84.77*** 100.4*** 92.17*** 85.31***
(11.12) (10.49) (10.07) (11.20) (10.56) (10.13)
Real GDP per capita t-1 (sq,logged) -5.494*** -5.119*** -4.772*** -5.605*** -5.159*** -4.808***
(0.646) (0.612) (0.589) (0.650) (0.616) (0.593)
Economic growth t-1 -0.212* -0.216* -0.110 -0.219* -0.222* -0.115
(0.113) (0.118) (0.114) (0.114) (0.119) (0.115)
Population t-1 (logged) 4.691*** 3.986*** 4.514*** 4.592*** 3.898*** 4.373***
(0.741) (0.711) (0.725) (0.766) (0.716) (0.731)
Consumption t-1 (logged) 5.993** 9.146*** 6.896** 5.975** 9.102*** 6.912***
(2.501) (2.779) (2.708) (2.482) (2.742) (2.670)
Investment t-1 (logged) -1.137 -0.811 -1.613 -1.031 -0.916 -1.700
(1.049) (1.117) (1.162) (1.045) (1.117) (1.163)
Government size t-1 (logged) 2.777* 2.981* 1.627 2.527* 2.605* 1.248
(1.531) (1.594) (1.623) (1.532) (1.577) (1.608)
Trade openness t-1 (logged) -10.26*** -10.76*** -8.595*** -10.32*** -10.69*** -8.522***
(1.263) (1.220) (1.174) (1.254) (1.219) (1.173)
Regime stability t-1 -0.0255 0.0130 -0.00633 -0.0296 0.0115 -0.00776
(0.0312) (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0315) (0.0350) (0.0347)
Democracy t-1 1.102*** 1.215*** 1.405*** 1.104*** 1.204*** 1.395***
(0.133) (0.154) (0.162) (0.133) (0.155) (0.163)
Civil war 64.65*** 65.24*** 62.55*** 64.74*** 65.38*** 62.67***
(8.352) (8.554) (8.374) (8.370) (8.561) (8.380)
GFI (logged) 8.643*** 6.494*** 6.512***
(1.370) (1.351) (1.376)
GFI*Area (logged) 5.320*** 3.874*** 4.201***
(1.490) (1.484) (1.521)
Constant -478.3*** -451.7*** -428.2*** -488.4*** -453.4*** -431.4***
(46.47) (45.49) (44.12) (47.70) (45.90) (44.53)
Regional dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Time e↵ects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 3,949 3,751 3,751 3,949 3,751 3,751
R-squared 0.165 0.173 0.201 0.163 0.172 0.200
Note: dependent variables is total terrorist attacks within a country per year. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
discretized variable GFI6, a growing positive relationship with exception on the fourth
level and this may be due mainly to the outliers or the omission of an e↵ect associated
with the national total area. This is captured later in the variable GFI*area (as well
as in the discretized variable GFI*area) and the margins presented in table 4 show
a positive relationship growing from the first level (beginning at the third). This is
according to the results presented by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) in their study
on decentralization.
The objective of this study is not to further analyze the socio-economic conditions
and other variables used as controls, but it is worth noting that the e↵ects of the
variables are according to the results presented previously in the literature with ex-
ception on consumption which has the opposite e↵ect. Investment and trade openness
6See the note in table 4 for a further description.
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Table 3: Zero-inflated negative binomial estimations
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZINB
Negative binomial
Real GDP per capita(logged) 5.626*** 3.918*** 4.332*** 5.957*** 3.952*** 4.405***
(0.730) (0.744) (0.697) (0.764) (0.777) (0.722)
Real GDP per capita (sq,logged) -0.292*** -0.199*** -0.224*** -0.308*** -0.200*** -0.227***
(0.0416) (0.0430) (0.0403) (0.0437) (0.0450) (0.0418)
Economic growth -0.0220*** -0.0218*** -0.0151*** -0.0229*** -0.0225*** -0.0159***
(0.00630) (0.00633) (0.00524) (0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00532)
Population(logged) 0.497*** 0.557*** 0.543*** 0.470*** 0.553*** 0.538***
(0.0367) (0.0378) (0.0387) (0.0381) (0.0403) (0.0414)
Consumption(logged) 0.770*** 0.417** 0.215 0.787*** 0.342** 0.147
(0.146) (0.171) (0.173) (0.139) (0.167) (0.169)
Investment(logged) -0.270*** -0.319*** -0.237*** -0.277*** -0.354*** -0.265***
(0.0872) (0.0957) (0.0867) (0.0858) (0.0951) (0.0844)
Government size(logged) 0.680*** 0.707*** 0.606*** 0.698*** 0.702*** 0.594***
(0.0997) (0.0970) (0.0911) (0.100) (0.0953) (0.0897)
Trade openness(logged) -0.765*** -0.712*** -0.859*** -0.781*** -0.728*** -0.875***
(0.0686) (0.0695) (0.0705) (0.0712) (0.0701) (0.0695)
Regime stability -0.00763*** -0.00677*** -0.00416*** -0.00849*** -0.00749*** -0.00486***
(0.00119) (0.00129) (0.00125) (0.00122) (0.00133) (0.00127)
Civil war 1.574*** 1.485*** 1.465*** 1.621*** 1.517*** 1.501***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.124) (0.122)
GFI (logged) 1.024*** 0.728*** 0.675***
(0.140) (0.147) (0.138)
GFI * Area (logged) 0.645*** 0.380*** 0.329***
(0.119) (0.131) (0.123)
Constant -33.53*** -24.50*** -26.19*** -35.21*** -24.03*** -25.84***
(3.042) (3.080) (2.902) (3.107) (3.212) (2.980)
Inflate
Democracy -0.348*** -0.381*** -0.395*** -0.350*** -0.385*** -0.398***
(0.0244) (0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0245) (0.0293) (0.0299)
Constant -3.344*** -3.648*** -3.887*** -3.375*** -3.706*** -3.952***
(0.184) (0.222) (0.231) (0.185) (0.226) (0.236)
↵ 1.211*** 1.184*** 1.050*** 1.233*** 1.200*** 1.066***
(0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0331) (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0330)
Regional dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Time e↵ects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 4,074 3,869 3,869 4,074 3,869 3,869
Note: Dependent variable is total terrorist attacks within a country per year. ↵ indicates the
overdispersion parameter of the negative binomial type II distribution. Robust standard errors in
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
are according to what is reported by Freytag et al. (2011), Hess and Blomberg (2008)
and Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006), the non-linear e↵ect of the GDP per capita is go-
ing according to Lai (2007). Political variables included (democracy, regime stability
and civil war) are in line with the di↵erent studies reported in Krieger and Meierrieks
(2011). Population as a demographic determinant also goes according to authors such
as Burgoon (2006) and Lai (2007). Finally, the e↵ect associated to larger government
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Table 4: Margins for GFI*area and Distance to port
GFI (logged) Margin [95% Conf. Interval] GFI*area (logged) Margin [95% Conf. Interval]
1 1
2 11.506** 1.508 21.503 2
(5.101)
3 30.802** 4.639 56.965 3 11.944** 1.523 22.365
(13.349) (5.317)
4 17.341*** 12.043 22.639 4 21.855*** 13.462 30.248
(2.703) (4.282)
5 27.473*** 23.475 31.471 5 27.333*** 23.282 31.384
(2.040) (2.067)
Note: Discretized variable in a rank of five taking the values from zero to the highest value of the
variable. Margins at means. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
continues what Kirk (1983) pointed out. In summary, these variables range according
to the study conducted by Freytag et al. (2011) in terms of socio-economic conditions.
IV.II Robustness
In this section we remark the results of the estimates with temporal cluster variance,
that is, a cluster variance for each year from 1971 to 2005. This since the history of the
twentieth century was marked by stages in which the countries su↵ered many terrorist
attacks by political and ideological di↵erences. For example, the decade of the 80’s
presents statistical significance in the estimates to the 1% mainly due to international
conflicts related to the Cold War, the nations involved and the di↵erent geopolitical
disputes of the time. In table C.II estimates are presented without very significant
changes in the results continuing with the intuition previously raised from previous
results.
In the second place, according to the arguments mentioned in previous sections with
respect to the mechanism of transmission about the geographical fragmentation towards
the number of terrorist attacks per year, this is, that the geographical fragmentation
prevents the total government presence throughout the national territory and political
freedom is accompanied by a nonconformity that leads to the creation of terrorist
groups, we performed a robustness check interacting our proposed variable (GFI*area)
with the level of democracy. Because the index from the Polity IV project includes
values between -10 and 10 it is necessary to rescale the index in order to avoid sign
problems. In addition, since the variable for democracy is discrete the inclusion of it as a
separate regressor generates strong problems of colinearity and therefore is not included
in the estimates. Table 5 shows the consistency of the estimates for both the variable
previously used and the new interacted variable, the latter introduces a coe cient
considerably smaller but significant at 1%. This is accompanied by a very interesting
phenomenon which is in line to a point raised by Abadie (2004) where the terrorist
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attacks increase in periods of transition toward a democracy; as new contribution is
presented the significant increases according to the level of geographical fragmentation.
This is contained in figure 7. See Appendix A.IV to find confidence intervals and
statistical significance associated with each interaction.
IV.III Further robustness checks
One criticism may be that the level of democracy (or of political freedom) of the coun-
tries do not fully capture the partial absence of government in the national territory. To
do this, a measure on greater decentralization seems to be a good alternative according
to the contributions of Frey and Luechinger (2004), Brennan and Buchanan (1990) and
Tiebout (1961) where it is stressed that the decentralized countries are more stable than
the centralized countries in political and administrative terms. It then used a dummy
that records the countries with federal systems taken from Treisman (2002) with the
addition of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea. Figure 8 displays the negative e↵ect
on the number of terrorist attacks to the federal countries. This e↵ect has not been
tested on many occasions in the literature by controlling for socio-economic conditions,
the marginal e↵ects presented in figure 8 have significance at 5% and 1% as shown
in Appendix A.V. We estimate including this variable as a control and although the
negative coe cient is significant at the 1% we wanted to submit, in addition to the
estimation, this dummy in interaction with our proposed variable (table 7 presents the
results). The aim of this interaction is to assess whether the negative e↵ect of decentral-
ization remains for the federal countries even against the positive e↵ect of the variables
on geographical fragmentation and in comparison with zeros in the observations for
non-federal countries. The results are consistent in the positive e↵ect for individual
variables about geographical fragmentation and negative for this interaction but with a
considerably lower coe cient in comparison to the last estimation where federal dummy
was introduced as an additional control (seventh estimation).
From other perspective, the literature has assessed other types of fragmentation,
these are, ethnic, religious and linguistic. It is important to present evidence that
the variable implemented for geographical fragmentation is not capturing these other
types of fragmentation in the estimates. For this reason, following Alesina et al. (2003)
we include the variables that the authors propose to assess these e↵ects. Table 6
presents Spearman’non-parametric correlation taking into account the distributions of
these variables. Subsequently, we followed the same methodology presented in section
IV.I including these elements and consistent results are founded, in fact the variable of
most interest (GFI*area) is presented with a higher coe cient regarding the number of
terrorist attacks across countries in the third estimation where all types of fractional-
ization are included as is shown in Appendix C.I.
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Table 5: Robustness check by interacting GFI*area and level of democracy
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZINB
Negative binomial
Real GDP per capita(logged) 5.688*** 3.961*** 4.287*** 5.997*** 4.001*** 4.361***
(0.707) (0.710) (0.670) (0.743) (0.741) (0.695)
Real GDP per capita (sq,logged) -0.299*** -0.203*** -0.223*** -0.314*** -0.204*** -0.226***
(0.0401) (0.0410) (0.0387) (0.0423) (0.0429) (0.0401)
Economic growth -0.0219*** -0.0218*** -0.0149*** -0.0228*** -0.0225*** -0.0156***
(0.00630) (0.00634) (0.00521) (0.00641) (0.00642) (0.00529)
Population(logged) 0.475*** 0.535*** 0.530*** 0.447*** 0.530*** 0.524***
(0.0362) (0.0382) (0.0388) (0.0377) (0.0409) (0.0417)
Consumption(logged) 0.622*** 0.317* 0.115 0.628*** 0.252 0.0575
(0.172) (0.182) (0.178) (0.166) (0.175) (0.173)
Investment(logged) -0.320*** -0.351*** -0.260*** -0.331*** -0.381*** -0.284***
(0.0909) (0.0978) (0.0867) (0.0891) (0.0973) (0.0846)
Government size(logged) 0.637*** 0.663*** 0.571*** 0.652*** 0.659*** 0.558***
(0.101) (0.0990) (0.0914) (0.101) (0.0974) (0.0903)
Trade openness(logged) -0.740*** -0.692*** -0.837*** -0.752*** -0.706*** -0.851***
(0.0696) (0.0688) (0.0702) (0.0723) (0.0696) (0.0694)
Regime stability -0.00817*** -0.00716*** -0.00465*** -0.00912*** -0.00789*** -0.00537***
(0.00117) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00120) (0.00130) (0.00126)
Civil war 1.609*** 1.514*** 1.493*** 1.659*** 1.547*** 1.531***
(0.123) (0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.128) (0.125)
GFI (logged) 0.916*** 0.628*** 0.589***
(0.148) (0.150) (0.141)
GFI * Area (logged) 0.575*** 0.324** 0.285**
(0.127) (0.134) (0.124)
GFI (logged)*Democracy 0.00742** 0.00812** 0.00740***
(0.00304) (0.00323) (0.00267)
(GFI * Area, logged)*Democracy 0.00481*** 0.00483** 0.00443***
(0.00180) (0.00189) (0.00157)
Constant -32.53*** -23.77*** -25.19*** -34.02*** -23.39*** -24.92***
(3.088) (3.035) (2.861) (3.165) (3.142) (2.927)
Inflate
Democracy -0.346*** -0.380*** -0.394*** -0.347*** -0.383*** -0.398***
(0.0255) (0.0303) (0.0307) (0.0257) (0.0309) (0.0314)
Constant -0.0368 -0.0207 -0.109 -0.0775 -0.0501 -0.151
(0.193) (0.207) (0.218) (0.200) (0.212) (0.224)
↵ 1.231*** 1.204*** 1.067*** 1.255*** 1.219*** 1.083***
(0.0323) (0.0326) (0.0339) (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0338)
Regional dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Time e↵ects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 4,074 3,869 3,869 4,074 3,869 3,869
Note: Dependent variable is total terrorist attacks per year. ↵ indicates the overdispersion
parameter of the negative binomial type II distribution. Robust and cluster standard errors
in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure 7: Margins plot of terrorist attacks by GFI*area(logged) in its interaction with
democracy throughout all levels of geographic fragmentation
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Figure 8: Margins plot of terrorist attacks by federalism and GFI*area (logged)
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Table 6: Non-parametric correlation between fragmentation variables
Variable GFI GFI*area
GFI 1
GFI*area 0.8531* 1
Ethnic Frac. -0.0078 0.0808*
Language Frac. -0.2406* -0.1301*
Religion Frac. -0.2368* -0.2391*
Note: Spearman’s correlation implemented. * p< 0.01.
Table 7: Robustness check by interacting GFI*area and a dummy for federalism
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ZINB
Negative binomial
Real GDP per capita(logged) 5.027*** 3.454*** 3.640*** 5.320*** 3.480*** 3.689*** 3.699***
(0.733) (0.731) (0.672) (0.769) (0.764) (0.696) (0.696)
Real GDP per capita (sq,logged) -0.256*** -0.169*** -0.180*** -0.269*** -0.170*** -0.182*** -0.183***
(0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0389) (0.0440) (0.0444) (0.0404) (0.0404)
Economic growth -0.0222*** -0.0220*** -0.0149*** -0.0231*** -0.0227*** -0.0156*** -0.0156***
(0.00627) (0.00631) (0.00516) (0.00638) (0.00640) (0.00525) (0.00524)
Population(logged) 0.555*** 0.610*** 0.615*** 0.527*** 0.604*** 0.609*** 0.603***
(0.0376) (0.0391) (0.0411) (0.0388) (0.0415) (0.0435) (0.0433)
Consumption(logged) 0.764*** 0.442** 0.215 0.790*** 0.378** 0.163 0.159
(0.147) (0.173) (0.171) (0.137) (0.167) (0.165) (0.165)
Investment(logged) -0.241*** -0.310*** -0.227*** -0.251*** -0.348*** -0.257*** -0.256***
(0.0868) (0.0963) (0.0863) (0.0852) (0.0956) (0.0839) (0.0839)
Government size(logged) 0.647*** 0.678*** 0.575*** 0.661*** 0.673*** 0.561*** 0.553***
(0.0989) (0.0982) (0.0900) (0.0985) (0.0962) (0.0883) (0.0884)
Trade openness(logged) -0.778*** -0.714*** -0.849*** -0.788*** -0.727*** -0.862*** -0.860***
(0.0685) (0.0695) (0.0711) (0.0709) (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0696)
Regime stability -0.00730*** -0.00709*** -0.00469*** -0.00806*** -0.00773*** -0.00530*** -0.00521***
(0.00114) (0.00127) (0.00121) (0.00117) (0.00131) (0.00123) (0.00123)
Civil war 1.541*** 1.482*** 1.451*** 1.583*** 1.515*** 1.489*** 1.493***
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.120) (0.119) (0.117) (0.117)
GFI (logged) 1.065*** 0.762*** 0.706***
(0.149) (0.155) (0.144)
GFI * Area (logged) 0.705*** 0.422*** 0.376*** 0.373***
(0.123) (0.136) (0.126) (0.126)
Federal -0.592***
(0.101)
GFI (logged)*Federal -0.183*** -0.151*** -0.165***
(0.0275) (0.0286) (0.0280)
(GFI * Area, logged)*Federal -0.111*** -0.0899*** -0.0980***
(0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0165)
Constant -31.64*** -23.30*** -23.99*** -33.41*** -22.97*** -23.76*** -23.70***
(3.043) (3.024) (2.772) (3.113) (3.156) (2.855) (2.855)
Inflate
Democracy -0.346*** -0.378*** -0.392*** -0.348*** -0.382*** -0.395*** -0.395***
(0.0239) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0240) (0.0289) (0.0293) (0.0293)
Constant 0.182 0.181 0.102 0.170 0.161 0.0736 0.0727
(0.147) (0.159) (0.170) (0.149) (0.161) (0.174) (0.174)
↵ 1.185*** 1.168*** 1.027*** 1.207*** 1.183*** 1.043*** 1.044***
(0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0326)
Regional dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES YES
Time e↵ects NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Observations 4,074 3,869 3,869 4,074 3,869 3,869 3,869
Note: Dependent variable is total terrorist attacks per year. ↵ indicates the overdispersion parameter of the negative
binomial type II distribution. Robust and cluster standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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V. Conclusions
This research makes a contribution to the literature related to the determinants of
terrorism by introducing variables such as geographical fragmentation on a background
of socio-economic conditions. According to estimates, it succeeds in showing a positive
e↵ect of the Geographical Fragmentation Index (GFI) and in its interaction with the
national total area (GFI*area). When analyzing margins associated with both variables
it is shown that the interaction between these two presents positive relationship and
steadily growing through all levels (statistical significant), margins that are calculated
leaving the other variables in their average level. This e↵ect is consistent across the
di↵erent estimates and robustness checks.
Even the interaction between the proposed variable (GFI) and others of political
nature, as the level of democracy and political decentralization, presents statistical
significant results that support our hypothesis. Namely, the geographical fragmentation
prevents the government’s presence throughout the national territory (in line what is
presented in Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2011)), which leads to a worsening in the
socio-economic conditions and therefore an incentive for terrorist behavior taking into
account that their opportunity cost is lower facing a fragile state (in coherence to the
findings in Crenshaw (1981), Krueger and Malecˇkova´ (2003) and Okafor and Piesse
(2017)).
Finally, it is important to note that this investigation also serves as a support to
what has already been presented by authors such as Freytag et al. (2011), Hess and
Blomberg (2008), Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) and Lai (2007) that have studied the
determinants of terrorism from the socio-economic perspective. As well as presented by
Li (2005b) and Kirk (1983) on democracy and government size as variables that have
a very particular e↵ect in its influence on the terrorist behavior. It is proposed then
for future research to develop econometric methods to use these types of models with
zero inflated negative binomial distribution for panel-type data and to analyze, using
aleatory e↵ects, the robustness of this type of geographical variables controlled by time
and region of the di↵erent countries a↵ected by terrorist attacks.
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A. Predictive Margins
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A.I Statistical significance and confidence intervals for margins by level of democracy and GFI*area (logged)
(figure 4)
Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval] Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Democracy GFI*area (logged) Democracy GFI*area (logged)
1 3 6,916 3,192 0,030 0,660 13,171 11 4 22,610 4,418 0,000 13,952 31,269
1 4 12,654 2,769 0,000 7,227 18,082 11 5 28,277 2,132 0,000 24,098 32,456
1 5 15,826 1,807 0,000 12,283 19,368 12 3 12,422 5,518 0,024 1,607 23,238
2 3 8,087 3,683 0,028 0,869 15,305 12 4 22,730 4,439 0,000 14,029 31,431
2 4 14,798 3,095 0,000 8,733 20,863 12 5 28,428 2,142 0,000 24,230 32,625
2 5 18,507 1,798 0,000 14,982 22,031 13 3 12,467 5,537 0,024 1,614 23,321
3 3 9,136 4,124 0,027 1,054 17,219 13 4 22,813 4,454 0,000 14,083 31,543
3 4 16,717 3,398 0,000 10,056 23,378 13 5 28,531 2,148 0,000 24,320 32,741
3 5 20,907 1,813 0,000 17,354 24,460 14 3 12,498 5,551 0,024 1,619 23,377
4 3 10,017 4,496 0,026 1,205 18,828 14 4 22,869 4,464 0,000 14,119 31,619
4 4 18,328 3,665 0,000 11,144 25,512 14 5 28,601 2,153 0,000 24,381 32,820
4 5 22,922 1,858 0,000 19,281 26,563 15 3 12,519 5,560 0,024 1,622 23,416
5 3 10,717 4,792 0,025 1,324 20,109 15 4 22,907 4,471 0,000 14,143 31,670
5 4 19,609 3,885 0,000 11,995 27,223 15 5 28,648 2,156 0,000 24,423 32,874
5 5 24,524 1,919 0,000 20,763 28,284 16 3 12,533 5,566 0,024 1,625 23,442
6 3 11,249 5,018 0,025 1,414 21,085 16 4 22,933 4,476 0,000 14,160 31,706
6 4 20,584 4,056 0,000 12,635 28,533 16 5 28,681 2,158 0,000 24,452 32,910
6 5 25,743 1,979 0,000 21,864 29,622 17 3 12,543 5,570 0,024 1,626 23,459
7 3 11,642 5,185 0,025 1,479 21,804 17 4 22,951 4,479 0,000 14,172 31,729
7 4 21,302 4,183 0,000 13,103 29,500 17 5 28,703 2,159 0,000 24,471 32,935
7 5 26,641 2,030 0,000 22,662 30,620 18 3 12,549 5,573 0,024 1,627 23,472
8 3 11,923 5,305 0,025 1,526 22,321 18 4 22,963 4,481 0,000 14,179 31,746
8 4 21,817 4,275 0,000 13,438 30,197 18 5 28,718 2,160 0,000 24,484 32,951
8 5 27,286 2,069 0,000 23,230 31,342 19 3 12,554 5,575 0,024 1,628 23,480
9 3 12,122 5,390 0,025 1,558 22,686 19 4 22,971 4,483 0,000 14,185 31,757
9 4 22,181 4,340 0,000 13,674 30,688 19 5 28,728 2,161 0,000 24,493 32,963
9 5 27,741 2,098 0,000 23,629 31,853 20 3 12,557 5,576 0,024 1,628 23,485
10 3 12,261 5,449 0,024 1,581 22,941 20 4 22,976 4,484 0,000 14,188 31,764
10 4 22,435 4,386 0,000 13,838 31,031 20 5 28,735 2,161 0,000 24,500 32,970
10 5 28,058 2,118 0,000 23,907 32,209 21 3 12,559 5,577 0,024 1,628 23,489
11 3 12,357 5,490 0,024 1,597 23,117 21 4 22,980 4,484 0,000 14,191 31,769
21 5 28,740 2,161 0,000 24,504 32,975
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A.II Statistical significance and confidence intervals for margins by GFI*area
(logged) and regime stability (figure 5)
Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
GFI*area (logged) Regime stability
3 1 22,063 10,141 0,030 2,188 41,938
3 2 14,335 6,607 0,030 1,386 27,285
3 3 9,375 4,281 0,029 0,984 17,765
3 4 8,801 3,891 0,024 1,175 16,428
3 5 8,493 3,810 0,026 1,025 15,960
4 1 40,371 8,532 0,000 23,649 57,093
4 2 26,231 5,617 0,000 15,221 37,240
4 3 17,154 3,793 0,000 9,719 24,588
4 4 16,105 3,444 0,000 9,355 22,855
4 5 15,539 3,276 0,000 9,118 21,961
5 1 50,490 5,497 0,000 39,716 61,263
5 2 32,805 4,113 0,000 24,744 40,866
5 3 21,453 2,347 0,000 16,854 26,052
5 4 20,141 2,397 0,000 15,444 24,839
5 5 19,434 2,109 0,000 15,300 23,568
A.III Statistical significance and confidence intervals for margins by GFI*area
(logged) and civil war (figure 6)
Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
GFI*area (logged) Civil war
3 0 10,039 4,473 0,025 1,273 18,805
3 1 40,857 18,813 0,030 3,985 77,729
4 0 18,369 3,642 0,000 11,231 25,507
4 1 74,760 16,052 0,000 43,298 106,221
5 0 22,973 1,885 0,000 19,279 26,667
5 1 93,498 10,638 0,000 72,648 114,348
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A.IV Statistical significance and confidence intervals for margins by
(GFI*area,logged)*democracy through all levels of (GFI*area,logged)
(figure 7)
Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
Democracy*
(GFI*area,logged)
GFI*area (logged)
1 3 1,769 0,879 0,044 0,046 3,492
1 4 6,380 1,687 0,000 3,074 9,686
1 5 12,674 2,093 0,000 8,573 16,776
2 3 4,021 2,015 0,046 0,072 7,969
2 4 14,501 3,553 0,000 7,538 21,464
2 5 28,806 5,627 0,000 17,778 39,834
3 3 5,228 2,295 0,023 0,731 9,725
3 4 18,855 4,851 0,000 9,348 28,363
3 5 37,457 6,473 0,000 24,770 50,144
4 3 4,205 2,034 0,039 0,219 8,191
4 4 15,165 3,523 0,000 8,260 22,070
4 5 30,127 4,000 0,000 22,286 37,967
5 3 2,948 1,388 0,034 0,228 5,667
5 4 10,631 2,583 0,000 5,569 15,692
5 5 21,118 1,620 0,000 17,943 24,294
A.V Statistical significance and confidence intervals for margins by GFI*area
(logged) and a dummy for federalism (figure 8)
Level interaction Margin Std. Err. P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
GFI*area (logged) Federalism
3 1 15,402 6,844 0,024 1,987 28,816
3 0 8,264 3,655 0,024 1,100 15,428
4 1 24,400 4,953 0,000 14,693 34,107
4 0 13,093 2,906 0,000 7,398 18,788
5 1 33,498 3,048 0,000 27,523 39,472
5 0 17,974 1,569 0,000 14,899 21,049
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A.VI List of countries
Afghanistan Croatia Israel Namibia Sri Lanka
Albania Cuba Italy Nepal Sudan
Algeria Czech Republic Ivory Coast Netherlands Sweden
Angola Denmark Jamaica New Zealand Switzerland
Argentina Dominican Republic Japan Nicaragua Syria
Australia Ecuador Jordan Niger Tajikistan
Austria Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Tanzania
Azerbaijan El Salvador Kenya Norway Thailand
Bangladesh Estonia Kuwait Pakistan Togo
Belarus Ethiopia Kyrgyzstan Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Belgium France Laos Papua New Guinea Tunisia
Benin Georgia Latvia Paraguay Turkey
Bolivia Germany Lebanon Peru Uganda
Botswana Ghana Lesotho Philippines Ukraine
Brazil Greece Liberia Poland United Arab Emirates
Bulgaria Guatemala Libya Portugal United Kingdom
Burundi Guinea Lithuania Russia United States
Cambodia Guinea-Bissau Macedonia Rwanda Uruguay
Cameroon Haiti Madagascar Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan
Canada Honduras Malaysia Senegal Venezuela
Central African Republic Hungary Mali Sierra Leone Vietnam
Chad India Mauritania Singapore Yemen
Chile Indonesia Mexico Slovenia Zambia
China Iran Moldova Somalia Zimbabwe
Colombia Iraq Morocco South Africa
Costa Rica Ireland Mozambique Spain
30
B. Overdispersion and zero-inflated evidence
B.I Overdispersion evidence
Democracy Mean Variance N
-10 1.4069 12.826 145
-9 2.6591 59.789 308
-8 1.4648 38.033 213
-7 3.0461 358.8 846
-6 13.253 2229.8 241
-5 23.506 4123.7 81
-4 11.244 1536.3 78
-3 23.551 3886.6 98
-2 8.5878 3874.7 131
-1 15.869 2628.1 99
0 24.074 5146.2 121
1 15 564.13 49
2 19.133 6573 45
3 17.741 721.77 58
4 15.438 2237.4 121
5 20.394 3630.1 155
6 23.23 3299.7 248
7 48.549 16867 164
8 43.197 9348.9 325
9 31.011 5533.3 263
10 15.59 1853.8 842
Total 16.088 3164 4631
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B.II Zero-inflated evidence
Figure 9: Histogram for the total number of terrorist attacks
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Figure 10: Histogram for the number of terrorist attacks (greater than 10 attacks)
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C. Robustness checks
C.I Di↵erent fractionalization types
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ZINB
Negative binomial
Real GDP per capita(logged) 4.338*** 4.236*** 4.257*** 4.053***
(0.731) (0.697) (0.721) (0.702)
Real GDP per capita (sq,logged) -0.222*** -0.218*** -0.221*** -0.208***
(0.0423) (0.0405) (0.0416) (0.0406)
Economic growth -0.0185*** -0.0186*** -0.0184*** -0.0183***
(0.00525) (0.00488) (0.00515) (0.00482)
Population(logged) 0.559*** 0.567*** 0.540*** 0.548***
(0.0430) (0.0436) (0.0427) (0.0463)
Consumption(logged) 0.214 0.0852 0.110 0.146
(0.161) (0.174) (0.173) (0.169)
Investment(logged) -0.313*** -0.279*** -0.253*** -0.334***
(0.0829) (0.0861) (0.0838) (0.0836)
Government size(logged) 0.638*** 0.679*** 0.581*** 0.701***
(0.0900) (0.0888) (0.0892) (0.0917)
Trade openness(logged) -0.838*** -0.827*** -0.876*** -0.830***
(0.0739) (0.0704) (0.0705) (0.0780)
Regime stability -0.00492*** -0.00452*** -0.00471*** -0.00348***
(0.00128) (0.00128) (0.00128) (0.00130)
Civil war 1.581*** 1.367*** 1.574*** 1.396***
(0.121) (0.130) (0.120) (0.125)
GFI * Area (logged) 0.261** 0.430*** 0.358*** 0.416***
(0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.137)
Religion Frac. (logged) -0.0682* -0.0858*
(0.0413) (0.0487)
Language Frac. (logged) 0.0270 0.105**
(0.0336) (0.0474)
Ethnic Frac. (logged) -0.179** -0.170**
(0.0696) (0.0804)
Constant -25.64*** -26.14*** -24.43*** -24.65***
(3.006) (2.852) (3.052) (2.971)
Inflate
Democracy -0.376*** -0.368*** -0.375*** -0.366***
(0.0274) (0.0286) (0.0278) (0.0287)
Constant -0.0486 -0.236 -0.0754 -0.256
(0.190) (0.215) (0.191) (0.216)
↵ 1.062*** 1.047*** 1.069*** 1.051***
(0.0333) (0.0339) (0.0333) (0.0335)
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES
Time e↵ects YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,773 3,630 3,757 3,614
Note: Dependent variable is total terrorist attacks per year. ↵ indicates the overdispersion parameter
of the negative binomial type II distribution. Robust and cluster standard errors in parentheses; ***
p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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C.II Robustness checks for zero-inflated negative binomial estimations
(clustered variance by year)
VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZINB
Negative binomial
Real GDP per capita(logged) 5.626*** 3.918*** 4.483*** 5.957*** 3.952*** 4.405***
(0.941) (0.840) (0.927) (0.970) (0.856) (0.868)
Real GDP per capita (sq,logged) -0.292*** -0.199*** -0.231*** -0.308*** -0.200*** -0.227***
(0.0515) (0.0478) (0.0514) (0.0531) (0.0487) (0.0477)
Economic growth -0.0220*** -0.0218*** -0.0225*** -0.0229*** -0.0225*** -0.0159***
(0.00550) (0.00557) (0.00566) (0.00569) (0.00576) (0.00549)
Population(logged) 0.497*** 0.557*** 0.508*** 0.470*** 0.553*** 0.538***
(0.0467) (0.0451) (0.0376) (0.0474) (0.0461) (0.0360)
Consumption(logged) 0.770*** 0.417** 0.474** 0.787*** 0.342** 0.147
(0.161) (0.171) (0.198) (0.149) (0.165) (0.191)
Investment(logged) -0.270*** -0.319*** -0.302*** -0.277*** -0.354*** -0.265**
(0.0914) (0.101) (0.0946) (0.0909) (0.100) (0.105)
Government size(logged) 0.680*** 0.707*** 0.701*** 0.698*** 0.702*** 0.594***
(0.117) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119) (0.122) (0.115)
Trade openness(logged) -0.765*** -0.712*** -0.809*** -0.781*** -0.728*** -0.875***
(0.0727) (0.0987) (0.0756) (0.0733) (0.0972) (0.0653)
Regime stability -0.00763*** -0.00677*** -0.00643*** -0.00849*** -0.00749*** -0.00486***
(0.000871) (0.000890) (0.000903) (0.000921) (0.000935) (0.00140)
Civil war 1.574*** 1.485*** 1.500*** 1.621*** 1.517*** 1.501***
(0.112) (0.107) (0.114) (0.113) (0.107) (0.111)
GFI (logged) 1.024*** 0.728*** 0.690***
(0.112) (0.133) (0.153)
GFI * Area (logged) 0.645*** 0.380*** 0.329**
(0.0998) (0.129) (0.128)
Constant -33.53*** -24.50*** -66.14* -35.21*** -24.03*** -25.84***
(4.139) (3.392) (39.65) (4.229) (3.517) (4.060)
Inflate
Democracy -0.348*** -0.381*** -0.382*** -0.350*** -0.385*** -0.398***
(0.0237) (0.0256) (0.0265) (0.0240) (0.0266) (0.0285)
Constant -3.344*** -3.648*** -3.786*** -3.375*** -3.706*** -3.952***
(0.225) (0.239) (0.234) (0.226) (0.246) (0.265)
↵ 1.211*** 1.184*** 1.195*** 1.233*** 1.200*** 1.066***
(0.0675) (0.0670) (0.0678) (0.0664) (0.0658) (0.0575)
Regional dummies NO YES YES NO YES YES
Time e↵ects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 4,074 3,869 3,869 4,074 3,869 3,869
Note: Dependent variable is total terrorist attacks per year. ↵ indicates the overdispersion
parameter of the negative binomial type II distribution. Robust and cluster standard errors
in parentheses; *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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